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I. Introduction 
Suspicion of private bankers and of their power has had a 
long history. This suspicion has been especially predominant 
among social groups whose economic future depended on continued 
access to a flow of credit at relatively low cost. This was in-
deed the case for the emerging class of small entrepreneurs-cum-
technocrats-cum-politicians of Costa Rica after World War II. At 
that time, Costa Rica was still a very small, open, rural econo-
my, entirely dependent upon exports of coffee and bananas. Its 
small banking system reflected, in turn, the simplicity of the 
economy. The new groups, on the other hand, sought opportunities 
associated with rapid structural change and were impatient when 
faced with the constraints typical of a developing economy. In 
their eagerness, they wanted to harness the power of the state in 
order to create new economic and political opportunities. In ad-
dition, they were confident that through scientific intervention 
their efforts would not only be privately profitable but would 
also contribute to economic development at large. The private 
banks, conservative and cautious, were an obstacle in their way. 
The 1948 civil war provided them with the opportunity to nation-
alize the banks. The. rationalizations and the justifications 
came afterwards, but the state monopoly in the mobilization of 
deposits from the public is still a landmark in the political 
economy scenery of Costa Rica. 
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This paper examines first the background for the national-
ization. It discusses the role and ideology of the 1948 Junta, 
the ostensible objectives pursued with the nationalization, and 
the possible reasons for this interventionist measure. Next, the 
paper examines the institutional evolution of the Costa Rican fi-
nancial system. From mimicking the private banks, the state-owned 
institutions evolved into labor-dominated bureaucracies and bor-
rower-dominated sources of rents. The Central Bank, entrusted 
with the direction of the system, attempted to influence resource 
allocation through quantitative/qualitative credit restrictions 
(tapes), credit rationing, and subsidized interest rates. 
Political parties and interest groups, in turn, attempted to 
control both the monetary authorities and the banks, in order to 
benefit from the implicit subsidies and the power that comes from 
the control of credit. Regulation was followed by avoidance, 
however, and both private banks and non-regulated intermediaries 
increasingly challenged the monopoly of the state-owned banks. 
The paper includes a brief review of the main outcomes with 
respect to financial deepening, credit allocation, access to fi-
nancial services, portfolio concentration, bank efficiency and 
profitability, transactions costs, and loan collection. In each 
case, a preliminary attempt is made to identify the influence of 
the nationalization on the outcomes. Recent deregulation and pri-
vatization attempts and the political economy reactions to these 
initiatives are described. 
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The paper abandons the assumptions of optimal intervention 
analysis that consider policymakers as disembodied, altruistic 
agents who maximize some social utility function and, instead, 
follows the "new political economy" in the view that the state is 
composed of groups of self-regarding individuals in strategic 
interaction with sets of private agents (Lal, Srinivasan). The 
paper, therefore, attempts to provide a view of the interplay of 
political, economic, and social forces that affected the decision 
to nationalize the Costa Rican commercial banks as well as the 
evolution of the system as the different coalitions changed over 
time. 
II. The Nationalization Decree 
During a radio speech the evening of June 19, 1948 Jose Fi-
gueres, head of the Junta that ruled Costa Rica for 18 months af-
ter a two-month civil war, announced the nationalization of the 
banking system. That day, only six weeks after it took power, 
the Junta suspended the constitutional guarant~es and it decreed 
a ten percent tax on capital in addition to the nationalization 
of the banks. The decision, the most important in the political 
economy history of the country during the second half of this 
century, represented a major attempt by new social groups to take 
economic and political power away from the traditional (coffee) 
exporting groups, which had so far controlled the banks, and to 
modify to their advantage the country's economic policies and 
productive structure (Rovira). 
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Decree 70 of the Junta stated: "Considering: (1) That within 
the organization of a modern economy, all agricultural, industri-
al, and commercial activities depend on bank credit, the alloca-
tion of which determines the progress or stagnation of the coun-
try. (2) That an economic activity of such importance should not 
be in private hands since it represents, by its own nature, a 
public function. (3) That the private banks lend not only the 
shareholders' own funds but also mobilize the country's savings, 
in the form of deposits from the public. (4) That it is unfair 
that the high profits of the banks, guaranteed by the state and 
the social order, be earned by their shareholders, who represent 
a minimal portion of the capital mobilized. Rather, these prof-
its should become national· savings and their investment should be 
directed by the state. Therefore, the Junta decrees: (1) Pri-
vate banking is nationalized. Only the state will be authorized 
to mobilize, through its own institutions, the deposits of the 
public. (2) The shares of the Banco de Costa Rica, Banco Anglo 
Costarricense, and Banco Credito Agricola de cartage are expro-
priated for reasons of public convenience. The state, through 
its Ministry of Economy, will take over the banks immediately. 
The form and conditions for payment of the shares will be regu-
lated afterwards. (3) The Ministry of Economy will provisionally 
keep the present form of organization of the banks and it will 
appoint their boards of directors and managers." 
.. 
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The banks so expropriated by the nationalization decree were 
owned and managed by Costa Ricans. No foreign bank had operated 
in Costa Rica after the Royal Bank of Canada left in 1936, faced 
with restrictions introduced by that year's Banking Law, which 
limited dividend payments to 12 percent of equity capital (Ortu-
no). The nationalization decree, therefore, had two main effects: 
(1) it created a legal monopoly in the market for deposits from 
the public, which represented a major restriction to entry into 
banking by domestic and foreign intermediaries; and (2) it trans-
formed three of the existing private banks into state-owned en-
terprises. One small private bank (Banco Lyon) was allowed to 
continue operations, but without authority to mobilize deposits 
from the public, and it soon specialized in international tran-
sactions. The largest bank, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, created 
as a public institution in 1914, continued to be operated by the 
state. Since 1936, its Money Issuing Department (Departamento 
Emisor) had exercised the functions of a central bank. 
III. Rationale for the Nationalization 
In his radio speech, Figueres further justified the innova-
ti on by indicating that "it is necessary to redirect the coun-
try's economic activities, in order to promote savings and the 
most productive use of resources. The greatest obstacle to this 
task is the prevailing organization of credit. The banks allocate 
the funds needed by agriculture, industry, and commerce. For this 
they use not only their own capital, but also the public's funds, 
.. 
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in the form of deposits. This gives them the extraordinary social 
power that they enjoy and (Figueres believed) this is an incredi-
ble anachronism. The administration of money and of credit should 
not be in private hands, as the administration of water or of the 
postal system should not be left in private hands. These vital 
functions should be undertaken by the state, the nation's polit-
ical organ. Banking is the safest and most profitable business. 
In a few years the private banks have been able to accumulate re-
serves well beyond their original capital. Their profits come, 
to the largest extent, not from the lending of their own capital, 
but from the mobilization of funds from the public. If the ser-
vice is public, public must be the ownership of the institutions 
which manage it, particularly since modern economic conditions 
make all industries and activities dependent on them. The banks 
promote the entrepreneurs they want to favor and asphyxiate oth-
ers. They control the country's economic progress and determine 
the success or failure of enterprises. Such a power should not 
be in private hands, but in the hands of the nation. The strict-
ly commercial criteria that characterizes the operation of the 
banks, although convenient for the shareholders, who make a safe 
investment when they finance imports of whisky, is not adequate 
for a country that needs to develop its agriculture and indus-
tries and which, 
but bank credit. 
for this purpose, possesses no other resources 
The economic policy of the Junta, which seeks 
the industrialization of the country and the intense utilization 
of natural resources, could not be implemented without the effec 
'., 
.. 
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tive control of credit policy. In order to achieve this control 
it became necessary to nationalize the private banks" (La Nacion, 
June 22, 1948). 
Additional arguments presented by the Junta and their sup-
porters sought acceptance of this highly interventionist measure 
and revealed its ostensible objectives. These goals included: 
(1) the selective allocation of funds to priority sectors, in or-
der to promote the diversification of the country's productive 
structure, under the assumption that a social optimum would not 
result from the banks' profit-maximization motives but could be 
achieved through appropriate credit policies; (2) increased ac-
cess to financial services, particularly to subsidized credit, 
for large segments of the population and, especially, for new en-
trepreneurs (the "democratization" of credit); (3) the use of ap-
parently inexpensive resources -bank deposits- to disburse loans 
at low rates of interest, in order to promote desirable activi-
ties, even if this results in losses for the banks; and (4) a re-
duction in the concentration of power, a constant preoccupation 
of the Costa Rican polity. It was claimed that "the state-owned 
banks will serve the interests of all sectors of the economy, the 
weak and the powerful, without distinctions due to wealth, posi-
tion, or influence" and that "given its public nature, in the 
hands of the state banking will always be regulated with the only 
criterion of maximizing social welfare (Facio, Zuniga, and Ros-
si). In general, the country's financial savings were perceived 
as a "public good" and commercial bank lending, which "creates 
money," as a natural state monopoly. 
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These arguments did not differ from those expressed else-
where. In 1947 Campbell had supported the nationalization of the 
Australian banks by claiming that it "will take away from the 
handful of rich men who control the banks the power they now have 
to dictate financial policy to the nation and will vest this pow-
er in the hands of the elected representatives of the people •.. 
Nationalization of banking will benefit all sections of the Aus-
tralian community except the mere handful of wealthy parasites 
who live on the proceeds of bank usury" (May). Thirty-five years 
later, the nationalization of the Mexican banks was also justi-
fied on the basis of the need to break the power of the private 
financial institutions (Tello). 
IV. Reasons for the Nationalization 
Jones and Mason identified four classes of reasons for the 
establishment of public enterprises: (1) ideological predilec-
tion, when the decision rests on the prior belief that certain 
forms of organization are generally preferable to others; (2) the 
acquisition or consolidation of political and economic power; (3) 
historical heritage or inertia; and ( 4) pragmatic responses to 
economic problems. 
The nationalization of the Costa Rican banking system mostly 
reflected a struggle for power among several interest groups. It 
was also a response to the fiscal problems faced by the Junta, at 
a time when it became necessary for the Junta to legitimize its 
continued rule. Although a state monopoly of insurance had been 
• 
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created in 1926, Costa Rica thus far had been characterized by 
laissez-faire economic policies. The nationalization was 
consistent, however, with the ideology of the new politicians of 
the Junta, who most likely selected from the available set those 
ideas that served them best (mostly those of the Peruvian Haya de 
la Torre, founder of APRA, a party which nationalized that coun-
try's banks when it finally came into power with Allan Garcia in 
the 1980s). 
The immediate justification for the 1948 civil war had been 
the need to preserve the country's exceptional electoral institu-
tions, since the results of that year's presidential election had 
not been recognized by the incumbent administration. These re-
sults did not become effective until 18 months later, when the 
Junta turned power over to Ulate, the elected president. In ad-
dition, the civil war provided the opportunity to a new group of 
social-democrat politicians to gain power and to attempt a redi-
rection of the country's economic policies (Rovira). With the 
civil war, they had a chance to control the government under ex-
ceptional circumstances. Indeed, the Junta became Executive and 
Legislative at the same time and it boldly took the opportunity 
to restructure the country's institutions. This was unusual in a 
country that had been and continues to be characterized by sus-
tained political stability and a well-ordered political system 
with strict separation of powers. The nationalization of the 
banks was their most important action. 
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At that time the Costa Rican society was simple and offered 
few opportunities for entrepreneurial activity beyond coffee. The 
new groups consisted of a coalition of small industrial entrepre-
neurs, a strong rural middle class, and the urban intellectual 
petite bourgeoisie. The Junta included representatives of the 
Centro de Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales (Center for the 
study of National Problems), which grouped young professionals 
and university professors, and of the short-lived Partido Social 
Dem6crata, a political party of small and medium entrepreneurs 
and professionals, which eventually became the dominant Partido 
Liberaci6n Nacional (PLN). Trained at the newly-created Univer-
sity of Costa Rica (1941), in disciplines for which the tradi-
tional export sector generated little demand, their leaders were 
eager to use their newly-acquired knowledge to influence policies 
and to create for themselves new economic opportunities. 
The center had been established to study national problems 
and to recommend "scientific and pragmatic" solutions. It's ide-
ology, which gradually replaced a liberal legacy of more than a 
century, was summarized by R. Facio, who claimed that "the objec-
tive of economic policy must be to increase and diversify the 
country's output: the preeminence of coffee must decline and so 
the nation's dependency on external markets ••• (but) the increase 
and diversification of the national output must result from the 
stimulus, defense, and organization of small owners" (Aguilar). 
The state must be a promoter and organizer of economic activity, 
through scientific intervention. In order to prevent the concen-
• 
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tration of power, however, the Center recommended the creation of 
autonomous institutions: decentralized public agencies in charge 
of specific services, presumably free of the influence of politi-
cal parties. With the new 1949 Constitution, the nationalized 
commercial banks became autonomous institutions. 
The Partido Social Dem6crata, in turn, attempted "a combina-
tion of measures to raise the standard of living and to guarantee 
the rights of the workers and the pe6n, to strengthen the small 
proprietors and to create new ones, to defend the small industri-
alist, the small merchant, the professional and the public-sector 
employee, and at the same time promote a general economic reacti-
vation" (Aguilar). This enumeration of goals explicitly identi-
fied the party's new constituencies. After its creation in 1945 
this party had been active in the political arena, with much vi-
sibility, but it had not managed to amass any electoral support. 
Even after victory in the 1948 civil war and the rule of the Jun-
ta, its electoral power remained wea~. In the elections for a 
Constitutional Assembly in December, 1948 this party only got 4 
out of 45 representatives. Under normal circumstances, it would 
have taken a long time before they would have made a difference. 
The civil war provided Figueres and his followers with a unique 
opportunity to exercise the control of government before their 
time and they took advantage of it (Rovira). 
While most of the members of the new groups lacked financial 
resources, bank credit had been particularly scarce during the 
1940s, as the private banks restricted lending, in collaboration 
• 
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with the Banco Nacional 's efforts to control the inflationary 
pressures that resulted from the War and from extreme fiscal mis-
management (Ortuno). The nationalized banks would become, there-
by, "the most loyal friends of the new entrepreneurs" (Rovira). 
In a reply to a few protests, the Junta (G. Facio) claimed that 
"it cannot be communist a reform that promotes private property. 
The nationalization of the banks does not go against private pro-
perty and it does not penalize private initiative; on the contra-
ry, it promotes it. The nationalization of credit will enormously 
promote private initiative, since anyone willing to produce will 
have loans at very low interest rates" (Gil). 
According to Gil, the explicit purpose of the nationaliza-
tion was to redistribute credit, to promote new businesses, to 
create new entrepreneurs, to provide a stimulus to private 
activity, and to avoid, through careful allocation of the funds, 
the concentration of resources in a few hands. The nationaliza-
tion of the banks, therefore, was a clear expression of the 
"opportunity-seeking" activities of new social and economic 
groups in an economy at the onset of a major structural transfor-
mation. 
The state-owned Banco Nacional had been created in 1914 in 
response to the refusal of the private banks to lend to the gov-
ernment. In 1948 the Junta faced a severe fiscal disequilibrium 
and it feared the influence the private banks would acquire if 
called upon to finance the deficit (Marten). Moreover, similarly 
to what Indira Ghandi did in India, the Junta used the national-
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ization of the banks to consolidate its power (Torri). Six weeks 
after the end of a civil war fought to protect the results of an 
election, the Junta had not turned power over to president-elect 
Ulate. The Junta needed, in addition to its military victory, to 
introduce a shocking reform in order to justify its exercise of 
power. To tell the population that bank deposits and the high 
profits from banking belonged to the people was not only bound to 
have a strong propagandistic impact on large strata of public 
opinion, but it also served to signal the Junta's determination 
to use its exceptional power to transform the country (Solera). 
Indeed, Lenin, impressed by the powerful political and economic 
influence of the banks, nationalized all Russian banks immediate-
ly after the 1917 revolution as the fastest and most effective 
way of assuming control over the entire economy. 
V. Lack of Opposition 
While university professors and students applauded the na-
tionalization, the private sector did not attack or oppose it. 
Only La Nacion, the main conservative newspaper, openly opposed 
the measure and claimed that it is private enterprise, and' not 
nationalization, which promotes economic development. The edi-
torial feared that this nationalization would place in the hands 
of the state, and in this way of those who control it, all the 
power of credit, which at any time can be used as a political 
tool. Guardia, one of the lonely dissenting voices, asked why, 
if the nationalization of the banks was such a fantastic idea, 
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few other countries had attempted it. In his view, the state is 
a poor credit manager and would allocate credit with political, 
not economic criteria. He feared that those businessmen who op-
posed the rulers would not have access to loans (Gil). 
Given its major impact, the absence of opposition to the na-
tionalization of the banks may be surprising. This passive ac-
ceptance reflected, however, the extraordinary power accumulated 
by Figueres and his followers as a consequence of the civil war 
and the fear that access to credit would be lost in the case of 
opposition. Debate about the merits of the intervention increased 
with time, nevertheless, once normality was restored, but there 
never was a chance that the measure would be reversed. 
There are historical moments when the state is reconstituted 
and when those elements that have seized the political initiative 
can set down the initial orientations of the state by devising an 
array of institutions which embody their ideological vision, by 
coalescing alliances to form the social foundations of the state, 
and by formulating a legitimation to transform their might into 
right (Bennet and Sharpe). The 1948 civil war gave the Junta the 
power to reconstitute the state, as reflected . by the 1949 
Constitution. The orientation with which they imbued key 
institutions became set in ways which delimited the future 
strategy of growth and which gradually constrained the pos-
sibility of anything but marginal changes in orientation. 
For a long time, the operations of the nationalized banks 
were not questioned. The concept of a more equitable distribution 
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of credit was the screen used by the groups which actually appro-
priated most of the benefits from the nationalization to defend 
it. These groups invested so successfully in the adoption of this 
"ideology," that attacks to the nationalized banks became 
increasingly viewed as "morally wrong." This is a role of 
ideology that has been stressed by North. 
While selective credit allocation and subsidized loans were 
used to compensate those who contributed to the party's progress, 
thus reducing the free-rider problem, promotion of the ideology 
was used to maintain popular consent. Moreover, although credit 
allocation was actively used to increase the following of the 
PLN, the portfolio of loans actually became increasingly con-
centrated in the hands of a few large clients. Thus, the appro-
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priation by a few of most of the rents created by the national-
ized banks was reconciled with the political objective of 
reaching a large clientele through the implementation of special 
small-farmer loan programs. While these programs reached a large 
number of borrowers, they required only a small proportion of the 
amounts disbursed (Vogel, 1984). 
Private interest groups were ambivalent about the innova-
tion: they were ready to leave banking to the state so long as 
access to subsidized loans increased. The Chamber of Industries 
agreed with the Junta's objective "to increase access to produc-
tion credit under special terms and conditions" (Facio, Zuniga, 
and Rossi). On the other hand, their costs of organization were 
too high, compared to the potential gains from reversal of the 
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borrower-dominated policies, for the groups of depositors, tax-
payers, and excluded potential borrowers hurt by the intervention 
to oppose it (Olson). This contrasted with the belligerence of 
bank employees, who had clear interests to defend and ample op-
portunities for organization. 
VI. Institutional Evolution of the Nationalized Banks 
Four dimensions of the institutional evolution of the Costa 
Rican banking system are worth mentioning: (1) the gradual change 
in organizational culture, from state-owned banks which mimicked 
the private banks from which they had sprung, to labor-dominated 
bureaucratic institutions; (2) the gradual change in the degree 
of autonomy from the Executive branch enjoyed by the state-owned 
banks, which led to an increasing political intrusion; (3) the 
changing role of the Central Bank and the recent deregulation at-
tempts; and (4) the gradual emergence of evasion and avoidance 
mechanisms, which led to increasingly active non-regulated finan-
cial systems and to growing competition from private banks. 
The Junta decided to keep the expropriated private banks as 
separate institutions in order to avoid a concentration of power 
and to promote some competition. These banks, in addition to the 
Banco Nacional, became the nationalized banking system (NBS). All 
the banks benefited from immediate capital contributions from the 
state. A large transfer to the Banco Nacional, earmarked for sub-
sidized, long-term agricultural credit, was the first one of nu-
merous and substantial fiscal and donor contributions aimed at 
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increasing the availability of loanable funds for target popula-
tions and end uses. The Junta also kept the old staff of the 
banks, most of whom had been loyal to Figueres. Bank employees 
had been at the forefront of the general strike that preceded the 
civil war and represented a major group among the white-collar 
middle classes that increasingly supported the PLN. The members 
of the boards of directors were also asked to retain their posi-
tions and most did (Solera). Although not much change in credit 
policies was to be expected when the directors stayed, this mea-
sure might have reflected the Junta's effort to keep the public's 
confidence in the banks. 
In practice, therefore, there had merely been a change of 
owner: the banks continued to operate for some time as if they 
were private commercial banks. Highly respected professional 
bankers, who knew their clientele well, continued as managers for 
a long time and maintained a considerable independence from the 
political power. The 1950s were, therefore, the golden age for 
the nationalized banks, revitalized by the infusions of funds and 
by exceptionally rapid economic growth. 
Gradually, however, the old bankers began to be replaced by 
politicians in the boards of directors and management of the in-
stitutions. The directors were appointed by the Executive branch, 
for four-year periods, while the managers were appointed by the 
boards, for similar periods. Given the alternation of different 
political parties in the control of the Executive and since one-
half of the board was replaced every two years, each new adminis-
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tration had to wait for two years before it controlled a majority 
of the board. This gave the banks considerable independence in 
those earlier years. In time, however, the appointments more and 
more became political rewards rather than the identification of a 
professional capacity in bank management. Appointed for only 
four years, the directors had little time and incentives to learn 
the complexities of banking and saw their position merely as an 
opportunity to advance their political career (Solera). From 
their political rather than technical perspective, therefore, 
they were open to the influence of the Executive and their po-
litical party and vulnerable to the pressures from the private 
interest groups which they represented. Political intrusion and 
rent-seeking thus increasingly characterized their performance. 
With the election of Figueres as president in 1970, the in-
dependence of the banks sharply declined. According to the 1949 
Constitution, the four nationalized banks had become autonomous 
institutions. The Constitution defined "autonomy" as independence 
with respect to both policy and management. The purpose was to 
protect the technical operations of these institutions from pol-
itical intrusion. By the late 1960s, however, the PLN leaders 
believed that independence with respect to policy had to be taken 
away from these agencies, since it was no longer compatible with 
their desire for an increasing role of planning. The PLN-con-
trolled Legislative approved a constitutional amendment in order 
to restrict the independence of the autonomous institutions to 
matters of management only (Romero). As a result, these agencies 
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had to follow the directives of the Executive. In the case of 
the banks, this influence was exercised mostly through the Cen-
tral Bank. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the monetary author-
ity had been managed by strong personalities, like Facio and So-
lera, and had enjoyed considerable independence. 
diminished over time (Gonzalez-Vega, 1988a). 
This autonomy 
An increasing politicization of the banks came also as a re-
sult of changes in the method of appointment of their boards of 
directors. After 1970, appointments were made at the beginning 
of each administration, 4 directors chosen from the winning party 
and 3 directors from the losing party. This explicit distribu-
tion of power within the banks was a clear recognition that the 
institutions had become major redistribution mechanisms according 
to political rewards. An additional loss of independence took 
place in 1974, when a new law authorized the President to freely 
appoint and remove an Executive President for each autonomous in-
stitution, as its main executive. This has allowed the winning 
party to centralize power and to use the banks as a political 
tool. In the case of the Central Bank, three Cabinet ministers 
were appointed as ex officio members of the board of directors. 
These ministers, in addition to the Executive President, gave the 
Executive branch's representation a majority in the board. 
With the nationalization of the banks, the control over man-
agement exercised by the private shareholders disappeared. The 
banks were supposed not to pursue profit maximization any longer, 
but a set of criteria for the evaluation of their performance was 
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never defined (Lizano, 1977). The staff of the banks gradually 
filled the vacuum thus created. The number of employees at the 
banks increased from 686 in 1950 to 8,340 in 1986. This repre-
sented a rate of growth of employment at the banks twice as fast 
as for the economy as a whole. Labor unions of bank employees 
increasingly used their strength to improve their salaries and 
fringe benefits. Bank wages became much higher than those for 
equivalent occupations in other sectors, while an important pro-
portion of the banks' accounting profits was earmarked for em-
ployee fringe benefits (pension plans, clubs). Rigid bureau-
cratic structures controlled by the unions severely restricted 
the adoption of promotion policies based on efficiency or 
performance-linked incentives to employees. 
VII. Central Bank Policies 
In addition to the traditional monetary functions, the Cen-
tral Bank was entrusted with the direction of the NBS and the 
promotion of economic development. Ever since its creation, its 
main policy instrument were the topes de cartera, ceilings on the 
amounts of credit outstanding by economic activity. With these 
quantitative/qualitative limits on credit volumes, the authori-
ties attempted to influence both the rate of expansion of domes-
tic credit and resource allocation. The Central Bank was also 
involved in the design of rationing criteria (cuadros de avio), 
which defined maximum amounts to be financed, usually per unit of 
land, for each particular crop. These amounts were based on hy-
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pothetical costs of production, frequently uniform for the whole 
country, estimated for the best available technology. 
While the topes were used to channel credit towards priority 
sectors or to discourage lending for non-pref erred activities, 
the avios were rules for loan-amount credit rationing in the pre-
sence of under-equilibrium interest rates (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). 
Subsidized loans and special credit programs created substantial 
rents. Directly-unproductive, profit-seeking activities by 
interest groups followed, in order to create and capture those 
rents, while individuals spent resources in fulfilling the 
requirements for eligibility (Krueger, Bhaqwati, Kane). The 
politicians, in turn, used their control of the rent-generation 
process as a tool to promote support for their political parties 
and used the topes and avios as selective incentives, in order to 
control free riders. Prominent party members, in turn, were 
rewarded with privileged access to loans and lack of vigorous 
efforts to collect them. 
over time, the shortcomings of this system became evident. 
The Central Bank's credit program contained quarterly limits on 
loans outstanding per bank, for a large number of categories 
(sometimes over 70). The multitude of often overlapping and in-
consistent ceilings became expensive for the banks to administer, 
while the Central Bank had to distract resources from its more 
traditional monetary functions to design and supervise the credit 
program. Given insufficient information and undefined criteria, 
the credit program simply reflected projections of the ceilings 
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for the previous year and the requests for modifications from the 
politicians. In this environment, the establishment and imple-
mentation of the tapes became increasingly vulnerable to inter-
est-group pressures, particularly at the level of the Board of 
Directors of the Central Bank. 
Rather than a maximum of credit allowed per activity, the 
tape was interpreted as an entitlement which obligated the state-
owned banks to lend the amount of the ceiling for each particular 
purpose. This made it difficult for the Central Bank to use the 
tapes as an instrument to control the expansion of credit, since 
any reduction would imply a curtailment of these "property 
rights." The risk-averse banks, on the other hand, interpreted 
that they were not authorized to lend for a particular purpose, 
unless the corresponding tape line item had been included in the 
credit program. In this way, the state-owned banks passed on the 
blame for the general shortage of credit to the monetary authori-
ties ("we are sorry, there is no~"), but still were able to 
accommodate preferred clients when necessary ("there is no tope, 
but we can help you"). As a result, year after year, the banks 
essentially made the same loans, despite major changes in 
circumstances, and there was little room for innovative lending. 
Given the impossibility to accurately forecast the composi-
tion of the demand for credit, numerous revisions of the credit 
program were required during the year. Despite these modifica-
tions, the banks hardly ever complied with the regulation (Vogel 
and Gonzalez-Vega). Moreover, excess demands for credit for some 
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purposes and excess supplies for others, that could not be easily 
corrected, increased the rigidity of bank management as well as 
the transactions costs for the banks and the borrowers. Soon the 
clients learned, moreover, to apply for loans for activities for 
which topes were available and to rely on fungibility for the im-
plementation of their desired production plans. Over the years, 
several reforms were adopted in order to minimize the def icien-
cies of the system and, in the mid-1980s, the Central Bank under-
took a major deregulation of the system, completely eliminating 
the topes (Loria, 1988). 
Similar problems became evident with respect to the avios, 
particularly after inflation accelerated and more frequent 
revisions became necessary. Active rent-seeking efforts by 
interest groups attempted to influence the estimation of costs of 
production and the determination of the proportion of those costs 
to be financed. over time, the producers interpreted the amount 
of the avio as an entitlement to a given loan size, independent 
of individual circumstances. Given the enormous heterogeneity of 
farmers, the application of a uniform avio has resulted in major 
inefficiencies and inequities (Graham). 
The Central Bank also set deposit and loan interest rates. 
The tope system provided ample opportunities for interest-rate 
differentiation: there was a different interest rate for each 
line item in the credit program, with a wide margin between the 
lowest and the highest rates. The implicit subsidies attracted 
rent-seeking activities. Several subsidized interest rates were 
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also established by law, as an institutionalization of entitle-
ments for specific groups (rural women, cooperatives, and the 
like). 
Given extremely low levels of inflation, of less than two 
percent per year in the 1950s and the 1960s, even the preferen-
tial rates were positive in real terms and therefore the implicit 
subsidy was moderate. With the acceleration of inflation in the 
1970s, on the other hand, real interest rates became negative and 
the subsidy substantial and highly concentrated in a few hands 
(Vogel, 1984). 
Until the late 1970s, the interest rates paid on deposits 
were never a concern for the authorities. With the acceleration 
of inflation and capital flight in the late 1970s, however, the 
Central Bank began to pay attention to the rewards to depositors. 
In 1978, a partial financial reform raised real interest rates to 
positive levels for a few months and a high interest elasticity 
of deposits was revealed. This reform soon failed, however, due 
to the absence of fiscal control and the resulting inflationary 
pressures (Gonzalez-Vega, 1988a). Thus, while the interest-rate 
reform stimulated deposit mobilization, the financing of the pub-
lic-sector deficit crowded out the private sector from the NBS 
credit portfolios. 
The explosive fiscal disequilibrium of the early 1980s 
resulted in a further acceleration of inflation. Interest rates, 
on the other hand, were not adjusted upwards sufficiently and 
became extremely negative in real terms. The financial system 
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experienced, as a result, a major contraction. The stabilization 
program implemented after 1982, on the other hand, resulted in 
too high real interest rates, in reflection of the large claim of 
the public sector on available resources (Gonzalez-Vega, 1988b). 
The Central Bank has also assumed the foreign-exchange risk 
associated with substantial flows of foreign financial assistance 
for the targeted credit programs of the state-owned banks and it 
has attempted to influence resource allocation through its redis-
counting programs, accessible only to the state-owned but not to 
the private banks. The Central Bank has also diverted con-
siderable amounts of funds to the public sector through its re-
serve-requirement policies. 
Numerous autonomous institutions and state enterprises (par-
ticularly CODESA, the development corporation that operates as a 
holding company of state enterprises, and the CNP, the price-
stabilization agency) have become major interest groups in their 
own right and have participated in the rent-seeking activities. 
Both CODESA and the CNP had automatic access to Central 
Bank funding. CODESA and its subsidiaries have engaged in all 
kinds of productive activities, usually reserved for the private 
sector: aluminum smelting; cement, fertilizer, sugar, and cotton 
production; railroads and urban and maritime transportation; 
aquaculture and shrimp fishing, and the like. These "productive" 
state enterprises have not been profitable, however. Between 
1977 and 1983, not one of CODESA's 12 main subsidiaries had any 
profits in any single year of the period. Their accumulated 
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losses represented 57 percent of their assets. on the other hand, 
the corporation's non-restrict access to Central Bank credit, 
which in 1983 represented one-half of all domestic credit for the 
public sector and 18 percent of all bank credit, was a major rea-
son for the severe crowding out of the private sector in SBN 
portfolios. At the same time, in 1983 CODESA's enterprises 
contributed only 1. 8 percent of the GDP and employed only O. 3 
percent of the labor force (Vargas). 
This hybrid of state power-private flexibility (a state 
agency created as a private corporation) has shown the worse fea-
tures of both worlds. It has not been restricted by the politi-
cal controls typical of government agencies (e.g., legislative 
authorization of funding) or by the profit discipline that con-
strains private firms. Projects have been preferred on the basis 
of their initial investment: the larger, the better, and the Cen-
tral Bank has been called upon to automatically provide the funds 
required. 
VIII. Avoidance: Private Banks and Non-Regulated Intermediaries 
By erecting restrictions to entry, the nationalization of 
the banks was a "negative innovation," which destroyed economic 
opportunities (Kane) • Inevitably, over the years, successful 
mechanisms of avoidance flourished in order to restore some of 
those opportunities. In the first place, this intervention 
created a state monopoly of deposit mobilization. Deposits were 
viewed as the raw material from which loans were produced and as 
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an input in production ("the only resource available," in Figue-
res' words). The decree actually mandated that "only the state 
will be authorized to mobilize the deposits of the public." 
The first exception to this very general statement came with 
a narrow regulatory definition of "deposits" as (sight) demand 
and savings deposits only. This opened the door to the mobiliza-
tion of term deposits by other intermediaries. Finance companies 
(financieras) established to mobilize funds for six-month terms 
and longer were allowed to operate, under the condition that the 
liability instrument not be called a "deposit" but instead an 
investment certificate (certificado de inversion). These finance 
companies remained relatively small for many years and their 
lending operations were financed, to a large extent, by inflows 
of foreign funds. 
In 1963, the U. S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) assisted in the creation of a private financial company 
(COFISA) with an infusion of low-priced, long-term funds. By 
1981, COFISA had borrowed abroad 25 times the US$ 10 million that 
USAID had initially provided and it had become the largest pri-
vate financial institution in the country. In the 1970s, more-
over, when inflation accelerated, the interest rates paid on de-
posits by the private financieras began to diverge from those 
paid by the state-owned banks. Successful competition for depos-
its increased the relative importance of the finance companies 
and, by 1975, their assets represented about 7 percent of the to-
tal for the financial system (Sagot). 
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When several of the financieras grew larger, they requested 
authorization to operate as "banks," under Central Bank regula-
tion. These private banks have been allowed to perform all bank-
ing functions, except the mobilization of demand and savings de-
posits. In addition, they have been denied access to Central Bank 
rediscounting. Their interest rates have been regulated by the 
Central Bank and their term deposits have been subject to reserve 
requirements. 
Most of the private finance companies and private banks 
created, however, subsidiaries registered in Panama, as a mechan-
ism to evade interest-rate ceilings, reserve requirements, and 
taxes. During the early 1980s, these subsidiaries became very 
active in the mobilization of foreign-currency-denominated depos-
its, when they offered a convenient vehicle for currency substi-
tution (Camacho and Gonzalez-Vega). In order to compete more ef-
fectively, the state-owned banks have jointly operated their own 
foreign subsidiary, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica. Even 
today, a substantial portion of the deposits and loans of the 
private intermediaries are booked at these Panamanian subsidia-
ries. 
The role of the private banks expanded considerably in the 
1980s, due to substantial support from the USAID. This support 
reflected both the Agency's new emphasis on private-sector devel-
opment and disillusionment with the nationalized banks. A report 
issued in 1983 characterized the NBS as "slow, excessively con-
servative, and incapable of significantly contributing to the 
• 
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economic development of the country because of its implicit lend-
ing policies as well as its inability to mobilize internal sav-
ings to any significant degree" (Pratt et al.). 
USAID assistance was facilitated by a 1984 reform of the 
Central Bank Law, which authorized private-bank access to redis-
counting when the source of the funds is foreign. The relative 
importance of the private banks has increased rapidly. Their 
share in the total portfolio of bank credit was only 0.3 percent 
in 1978. This share had increased to 4.6 percent by 1983, just 
before the USAID assistance escalated. 
private banks in total outstanding 
By 1986, the share of the 
credit was 15.3 percent. 
Moreover, their share in the flow of new loans granted each year 
increased from 5.4 percent in 1983 to 20.1 percent in 1986. The 
importance of the private banks has been particularly pronounced 
in the case of industrial loans. By 1986, these banks granted 
43.3 percent of all industrial credit in the country. The 
expansion of the private banks has clearly reflected the major 
role of foreign donors in the political economy of a small 
country. 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of the NBS was not lim-
ited to the private sector or the international donors. The auth-
orities found it necessary to create new public-sector financial 
institutions, in order to provide services not supplied by the 
state-owned commercial-cum-development banks. Savings and loan 
institutions specialized in housing finance, cooperative finan-
cial agencies, a Workers Savings Bank (Banco Popular) which mob-
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ilizes forced employee savings, a municipal financial institution 
and a students' loan program are among the new mechanisms created 
(Lizano, 1977). 
As a result of these institutional developments, the Costa 
Rican regulated financial system today is comprised of four 
state-owned commercial banks, 17 private commercial banks, 56 
finance companies, 51 credit unions, 7 savings and loan associa-
tions, and 7 state-owned non-bank intermediaries. The state-
owned commercial banks still accounted for 76 percent of the as-
sets of the system in 1986 (although some of the weight may be 
illusory, in light of the quality of the loan portfolio of the 
NBS). There has been, in addition, a rapidly growing number of 
nonregulated finance companies. 
Recently, there has been an increasing concern about the 
growing number and aggressiveness of these nonregulated inter-
mediaries and about the need to extend the surveillance of the 
Superintendency of Banks, attached to the Central Bank, over the 
activities of private intermediaries, in response to concerns 
similar to those expressed by Dooley and Mathieson. These com-
panies have been offering a wide variety of savings instruments 
with a variety of yields, ranging from 40-60 percent interest per 
annum on term deposits, to more sophisticated activities such as 
managing and investing deposits of clients on short-term se-
curities at the National Securities Exchange (Balsa Nacional de 
Valores) and paying 10-12 percent per annum on these "demand 
deposits" (Sagot). 
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These concerns reached a climax towards the end of 1987, 
when millions of colones were lost by depositors of nonregulated 
companies that went bankrupt. These events, in turn, stained the 
image of the private financial intermediaries and led to renewed 
demands for government intervention and for measures to protect 
the monopoly of the NBS. Several bills have been under discus-
sion at the Leg isl a ti ve Assembly, to more tightly regulate the 
financial system. This reaction has been unfortunate and it 
highlights the importance of the superintendency (Gonzalez-Vega 
and Zinser). In the words of the manager of one of the state-
owned banks, "the best thing that could have happened to the 
nationalized banks has been the competition 
banks." Adequate supervision seems to be 
protection of such competition. 
from the private 
critical for the 
Finally, there has been an explosive growth of the National 
Securities Exchange (Balsa Nacional de Valores). Although the 
overwhelming proportion of both the number and the value of its 
transactions has been in public-sector debt instruments, private-
sector participation in the mobilization of funds has rapidly 
grown over the past years. Placement of private paper has recent-
ly represented about 4 percent of total transactions. More than 
a market for shares, the Exchange has been a market for obliga-
tions (Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo) . The expansion of the Exchange 
has been both a reflection of regulatory avoidance as well as 
another force for privatization and increased competition in the 
financial market of Costa Rica. 
32 
IX. Financial Deepening 
Costa Rica experienced sustained financial deepening during 
the 1950s and the 1960s. Financial progress, which was particu-
larly rapid during most of the 1970s, was interrupted at the end 
of the decade, however, and acute financial repression followed. 
Table 1 shows that both the money supply (M2), in the broad sense 
of currency and demand, savings, and term deposits, as well as 
domestic credit increased rapidly, when measured in real terms, 
during the first 30 years after the nationalization. As shown in 
Table 2, the ratio of M2 to the GDP augmented from 18 percent in 
1950 to 24 percent in 1970 (it had been 27 percent in 1969) and 
to 42 percent in 1978. Most of this process of financial deepen-
ing resulted from the growth of quasimoney, particularly in the 
1970s, as changing preferences for liquidity, risk, and returns 
led to the diversification of financial-asset portfolios. Simi-
larly, the ratio of domestic credit to the GDP increased from 22 
percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1978 (Gonzalez-Vega, 1985). Com-
pared to other developing countries, by the late 1970s Costa Ri-
ca's indicators of financial deepening reflected a positive per-
formance. 
A difficult question refers to the extent to which financial 
deepening was facilitated or retarded by the nationalization of 
the banks. On the one hand, all of the other Central American 
countries, where the banks had not been nationalized, experienced 
similarly vigorous financial progress (Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo). 
This was everywhere produced by price and exchange-rate stability 
.. 
33 
which made, during most of the period, the real returns to domes-
tic financial assets positive. In the case of Costa Rica, finan-
cial deepening also reflected rapid and sustained economic growth 
and political stability. Despite financial deepening, however, 
Costa Rica's domestic savings ratio has been particularly low and 
the country has relied heavily on foreign savings for the f inanc-
ing of domestic investment. 
On the other hand, the nationalization led to an expansion 
of the network of bank branches well beyond what could have been 
expected otherwise, while the idea that the state-owned banks 
cannot go bankrupt might have promoted depositor confidence. At 
the time of the nationalization there were 43 bank branches in 
Costa Rica, one for every 20,000 inhabitants. Of these, more-
over, 38 belonged to the state's Banco Nacional (Hess). By 1986, 
on the other hand, there were 248 bank branches in the country, 
namely, one for every 10,000 persons. This is the third lowest 
ratio of population to bank branches in Latin America, after Uru-
guay and Trinidad and Tobago. A large proportion of these bank 
offices are rural branches (Juntas Rurales), which have made pos-
sible a greater penetration of the countryside than in other dev-
eloping countries (Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo). 
The monopoly of the mobilization of deposits enjoyed by the 
NBS, however, has been reflected by a poor service to the 
depositors of the state-owned banks, who have had to incur in 
high transactions costs. These costs have discouraged many from 
holding financial assets. Financial deepening in Costa Rica 
.. 
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seems to have been, therefore, more the result of the appropriate 
macroeconomic policies that maintained price stability for a long 
time, than of explicit concerns with financial intermediation, 
and particularly with deposit mobilization, by the nationalized 
banks. 
When macroeconomic management failed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the system rapidly collapsed. Nationalization, per 
se, seems to have had a mixed impact on the process of financial 
deepening. In particular, it prevented the development of a more 
integrated financial market, where an appropriate institutional 
division of labor might have resulted in a more efficient 
provision of all types of financial services, including deposit 
mobilization. 
x. Fiscal Crises and Financial Bepression 
The Costa Rican financial system suffered a significant blow 
with the fiscal crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given 
the increasing discrepancy between public-sector revenues and ex-
penditures and the loss of access to foreign financial markets, 
the fiscal deficit was increasingly financed with domestic bank 
credit. The rapid expansion of domestic credit made it impossible 
to sustain the fixed exchange rate and led to the loss of inter-
national monetary reserves, to accelerating inflation, and to de-
valuation. The resulting financial repression produced a signif-
icant contraction of the banking system. 
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Table 1 shows negative real rates of growth for all major 
money and credit aggregates for the 1978-1982 period. In real 
terms, by 1982 the money supply in the broad sense (M2) repre-
sented only 69 percent of its 1978 value, while the money supply 
in a narrow sense (Ml) represented only 56 percent of its 1978 
value. Similarly, by 1982 real domestic credit amounted to only 
42 percent of its 1980 value. The most dramatic contraction took 
place with respect to domestic credit for the private sector 
which, by 1982, represented only 36 percent of the 1978 level. 
Domestic credit for the public sector, on the other hand, 
continued to increase until 1980, but it eventually declined. By 
1982, credit for the public sector reached only 46 percent of its 
1980 level (Gonzalez-Vega, 1988b). 
As claimed by Gonzalez-Vega (1988a), the difficulties were 
essentially a crisis of the public sector and reflected a mis-
judgment about the appropriate size and composition of govern-
ment. In turn, the hyperexpansion of the public sector resulted, 
in the general manner explained by Lal, from the proliferation of 
entitlements to income transfers for a multi tu de of interest 
groups. These entitlements, which grew well beyond sustainable 
levels, reflected the overall nature of Costa Rica's political 
economy environment (Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes). Interest-rate 
subsidies and foreign-exchange subsidies granted through the NBS 
represented a major proportion of these entitlements. 
Once the coffee boom of the mid-1970s was over, these 
transfers had to be financed with domestic bank credit. A major 
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crowding out of the private sector in the portfolios of the NBS 
was the consequence. Table 2 reports that the ratio of credit 
for the private sector to the GDP declined from 29 percent in 
1978 to 18 percent in 1986, while the ratio of credit for the 
public sector to the GDP steadily increased. Also, as shown in 
Table 3, the share of the private sector in total domestic credit 
declined from 86 percent in 1970 to 49 percent by 1986. More-
over, in the early 1980s, the public sector received about two-
thirds of the net annual additions to domestic credit. Auton-
omous agencies and public enterprises, such as CODESA and the 
CNP, became powerful interest groups in the struggle for declin-
ing credit volumes. In the end, however, inflation was the easy 
winner and credit for the public sector measured at constant 
prices declined 
All of the Central American financial systems have been in 
the midst of an acute crisis during the 1980s. To a large extent, 
the difficulties have resulted from the same causes, both exter-
nal and domestic. The contraction of the banking system was more 
pronounced in Costa Rica, however, than in the other countries 
(Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo). The nationalization of the banks seems 
to have q9ntributed to the magnitude of this collapse. The na-
tionalization facilitated both the proliferation of implicit sub-
sidies that was at the fiscal root of the crisis as well as the 
acute crowding out of the private sector from credit portfolios. 
Numerous public-sector agencies exercised senior claims on the 
available loanable funds, leading to the exclusion of private 
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clientele. Influential borrowers linked to political parties and 
powerful interest groups were rationed the least. The national-
ization also resulted in a poor service to depositors and, there-
fore, in greater incentives for currency substitution and the ac-
cumulation of inflation hedges. Many depositors feared a freeze 
of their accounts, particularly after the Mexican experience. 
With high inflation and devaluation expectations during the cri-
sis, the mobilization of domestic funds through the NBS rapidly 
shrunk. Moreover, the rigidity of the NBS not only contributed 
to the crisis, but it has jeopardized the rapid recovery of the 
economy as well, in view of obsolete financial technologies and 
bureaucratic procedures. 
XI. Agricultural credit and Access to Financial Services 
In many respects, for a long time Costa Rica has been a suc-
cess story with respect to agricultural credit. The authorities 
became interested in small-farmer credit in 1914, when the Banco 
Nacional was created. At that time, the Cajas Rurales were or-
ganized, "to liberate the small farmers from the usurious condi-
tions of moneylender loans, and to stimulate production of basic 
grains for domestic consumption. " After one year, 2 7 Cajas had 
been established and were lending to 1,000 farmers the equivalent 
of 15 percent of the bank's portfolio. In 1936, the Cajas became 
the Juntas Rurales and the concept of credit allocation through a 
local board of neighbors was maintained (Gonzalez-Vega, 1973). 
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By 1948, when the private banks were nationalized, the Jun-
tas had already become a major instrument of the government's ag-
ricultural policies. Of the 157,146 loans granted between 1937 
and 1952, only 36 loans had not been repaid. Of the equivalent of 
US$ 18 million disbursed during the same period, default amounted 
to only US$ 2,390. This was a most impressive repayment record 
by any standards. It reflected the character of Costa Rican farm-
ers, a tradition of respect for contracts and for legal institu-
tions, and the creditworthiness-evaluation practices of the local 
boards. 
This role did not change with the nationalization. In 1952, 
the 38 Juntas in operation authorized 19,994 loans, for the e-
quivalent of US$ 3.7 million. What is surprising, as shown in 
Table 5, is that the number of new loans granted every year did 
not increase beyond 20,000 until the mid-1970s. on the contrary, 
the number of loans averaged 17,433 per year during the 1950s and 
15,525 per year during the 1960s. This number had declined to 
11,996 by 1969. In the 1970s, moreover, the number of new loans 
grew mostly as a consequence of major donor programs, particular-
ly from the USAID, targeted toward small farmers. 
After a maximum of 24,284 loans was reached in 1976, during 
the coffee boom, the number of new loans from the Juntas declined 
again and in the early 1980s it was well below the numbers 
already reached in the early 1950s. Therefore, small-farmer 
access to credit, measured by the number of Junta Rural new loans 
granted each year, did not increase significantly after the 
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nationalization. Moreover, for a long time the small-farmer 
credit programs of the other nationalized banks were insig-
nificant compared to the Juntas Rurales. 
Costa Rican farmers have enjoyed, however, a comparatively 
ample access to credit. The proportion of farmers with access to 
bank loans has been above 30 percent. If bank credit delivered to 
coffee producers through the beneficios is included in formal 
credit, this proportion has been close to an exceptionally high 
45 percent. These outcomes, however, have been the result of in-
stitutional innovations (the Juntas Rurales) that preceded the 
nationalization of the private banks, of the widespread ownership 
of titled land among farmers (distribution of property rights), 
and of the generalized process of financial deepening enjoyed by 
the country. 
On the other hand, at present the private banks operate only 
a few branches outside San Jose. Although this may reflect their 
recent establishment, public ownership of the Banco Nacional has 
possibly been the most important determinant of the extension of 
its network of branches and, thereby, of its coverage of a wide 
rural clientele. This may be a reason to promote other financial 
intermediary types and not only commercial banks, but it is not a 
justification for the nationalization of the entire banking 
system, however. 
In real terms, the total flow of credit granted each year by 
the Juntas Rurales grew until the mid-1960s and it then stagnated 
and declined, as shown in Table 5. By the mid-1980s, the purchas-
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ing power of these loans was equivalent to their real value dur-
ing the mid-1950s. Average size of loan grew until the late 1960s 
and it then declined. By 1986, this average size was equivalent, 
in real terms, to the levels observed in the mid-1950s, despite 
substantial growth of farm incomes and credit demands. This evo-
lution corresponded to the diminishing share of the Juntas Rura-
les in the portfolio of the Banco Nacional, as shown in Table 6. 
In effect, this share dropped from 21 percent in 1970 to 6 per-
cent in 1982, at the worst moment of the crisis. 
The reduction of the portfolio share of the Juntas Rurales 
reflected the iron law of interest-rate restrictions (Gonzalez-
Vega, 1984). First with the acceleration of inflation after 1973 
and the accompanying increasing transfers implicit in subsidized 
credit and afterwards with the contraction of the availability of 
real loanable funds as a consequence of the fiscal crisis, the 
proportion of the loan portfolio allocated to marginal clientele, 
even in a nationalized banking system, shrunk. 
In the case of the Juntas the reason, however, was not a 
greater risk associated with small farmers, as predicted for 
profit-maximizing institutions. It has been shown that in Costa 
Rica small farmers have always had good repayment records (Vogel, 
1981). In the political economy context of the nationalized bank-
ing system, on the contrary, the state-owned banks were forced to 
sustain the supply of credit for the larger and influential 
borrowers, despite their poorer repayment records, at the expense 
of the more punctual small borrowers. Table 6 shows that after 
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inflation accelerated and real interest rates became negative, 
the average size of loan in the Commercial Department of the 
Banco Nacional, which serves large borrowers, grew from 5.6 times 
the average size of small-farmer loans in 1971 to 12.8 times in 
1975. Indeed, as predicted by the iron law, between 1971 and 
1975 the real average size of the small-farmer loans declined by 
43 percent, while the average size of Departamento Comercial 
loans increased by 40 percent during the same period. This 
contrast was even more pronounced during the crisis of the early 
1980s. 
XII. Implicit Subsidies and Portfolio Concentration 
Compared to other developing countries, the nationalized 
banking system of Costa Rica has provided access to credit for a 
large proportion of the population. Access to deposit facilities 
and to other financial services has been provided to a smaller 
proportion. A survey of agricultural borrowers from the Banco 
Nacional found that, although on the average these farmers had 
been clients of the institution for more than nine years, only 17 
percent had checking accounts, 25 percent held savings accounts, 
and 5 percent had term deposits with any of the four nationalized 
banks (Gonzalez-Garita, 1986). 
The emphasis on credit rather than deposits has been a 
characteristic of public development banks that have enjoyed 
ample access to Central Bank and donor funds (Bourne and Graham). 
It is consistent with the political economy of the nationaliza-
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tion and with the desire to use credit as a political tool. An 
ample availability of loans helps political parties to stay in 
power. The rent-seeking activities of influential interest 
groups, on the other hand, will tend to concentrate credit 
portfolios in a few hands. This will reflect the superior organ-
izational capacity of small and homogeneous groups for collective 
action, as explained by Olson. These groups will be represented 
in the boards of directors of the banks and will have a dispro-
portionate influence on the process of credit rationing. They 
will make sure that a wide tope is always available and that the 
avios not only finance a high proportion of potential costs, but 
are frequently revised upwards. 
The state-owned banks of Costa Rica have been a relatively 
successful instrument for these purposes. on the one hand, they 
have provided access to loans for large numbers of producers. 
Through loan-size credit rationing it has been possible to ser-
vice many borrowers with the available loanable funds, although 
an unsatisfied demand for credit at the prevailing interest rates 
has been prevalent (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). The multitude of bank 
customers, on the other hand, have elected the politician-entre-
preneurs who have captured the lion's share of the credit port-
folios and of the implicit subsidies. 
As shown by Vogel (1984), despite the nationalization of the 
banks, there has been a high concentration of credit portfolios 
in Costa Rica. The distribution of loans by size has been more 
unequal than the distribution of land or the distribution of 
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income. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, concentration has been 
increasing, as would be predicted by the iron law of interest-
rate restrictions. In 1974, less than 10 percent of the number 
of borrowers received more than 80 percent of the amounts 
disbursed for agriculture by the Banco Nacional. In 1981, when 
real interest rates became particularly negative, less than 10 
percent of the borrowers received more than 90 percent of the 
amounts (Loria, 1982). Similar concentration also characterized 
other portfolio components and other state-owned banks. 
As a consequence of this concentration, few have benefited 
from most of the implicit interest-rate subsidy, particularly 
during inflationary periods when the real rates of interest on 
loans have become negative. As an example, under the conserva-
tive assumption that the social opportunity cost of the funds was 
10 percent per year, in real terms, the rate effectively charged 
on loans during 1974 was a negative -20 percent. Thus, the im-
plicit rate of subsidy was 30 percent. Agricultural credit re-
presented close to 60 percent of the value added in agriculture 
and over one-half of the loan portfolio of the banks. This meant 
that, in the important case of agriculture, the grant transferred 
through subsidized credit was equivalent to 20 to 25 percent of 
value added in the sector. 
On the other hand, only between 30 and 40 percent of the 
agricultural producers had access to bank loans, while the 
remaining 70 percent were excluded. In addition, there was a 
high degree of portfolio concentration. In the case of the Banco 
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Nacional, which granted over onehalf of all agricultural credit 
in the country, less than two percent of the borrowers accounted 
for over 60 percent of the amounts loaned, as shown in Table 4. 
This meant that less than one percent of the agricultural pro-
ducers of Costa Rica received more than 60 percent of the agri-
cultural credit granted by the banks and over 60 percent of a 
substantial subsidy, equivalent to almost 25 percent of the value 
added in agriculture in 1974. In addition, by the end of the 
decade it was estimated that about 50 percent of the loan 
portfolio of the banks represented defaulted loans. There was a 
significant transfer on this count, too, to the few privileged 
large borrowers who did not repay their loans. 
XIII. Credit Allocation 
At the time of the nationalization of the banks, only 31 
percent of their portfolio was devoted to agricultural and in-
dustrial loans. The proportion of agricultural loans was already 
higher than the average for Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1988c). Over the years, however, this proportion 
at least doubled, to become the highest for Latin America, as 
shown in Tables 8 and 10. On the other hand, the share of crops 
in credit outstanding declined, from 4 7 percent in 19 5 7 to 2 o 
percent in 1979, while the share of industry increased from 10 
percent in 1958 to 32 percent in 1985. 
These changes in portfolio composition reflected both the 
structural transformation of the country after the adoption of 
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the import-substitution strategy of industrialization and the 
relative strength of the manufacturing interest groups that had 
promoted the protectionist strategy. The political power of the 
ranchers was also reflected in the rapid growth of the share of 
credit for livestock, which grew from 12 percent of the total in 
1958 to 30 percent in 1973. 
The larger shares of credit portfolios devoted to loans for 
"productive" purposes after the nationalization may be inter-
preted as an indicator of the successful achievement of the goal 
to modify the allocation of credit towards a socially more 
efficient pattern. However, there is a substantial discrepancy 
between the stated uses of the loan funds and the marginal 
changes in economic activity, given the fungibility of credit. 
In view of the characteristics of the tope system, there were 
strong incentives to request loans for purposes for which topes 
were available. Furthermore, given the ample access to credit 
for the larger producers, the opportunities for marginal sub-
stitutions seem to have been ample. To the extent to which the 
loans were granted with political rather than technical criteria, 
credit deviation and fungibility seem to have been substantial 
(Lizano, 1977). In these circumstances, on the one hand it 
becomes impossible to evaluate the use of the loanable funds, 
while on the other hand one suspects that many loans were not 
used for socially-optimum purposes. 
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XIV. Borrowing Costs 
What matters for the borrower's investment and production 
decisions is the total cost of the funds. In addition to interest 
payments, these cost includes explicit expenses, such as bank 
fees and commissions; taxes and legal expenditures; the borrow-
er's transportation, lodging, and food costs during trips to the 
bank; and bribes. Implicit costs include the value of the time 
spent in completing loan transactions. Lack of timeliness and 
insufficient loan amounts are also costly. Delays in disburse-
ment result in lower yields, while too small loans make comple-
mentary funds from other sources and the additional transactions 
costs inevitable. Loans from the NBS have been expensive, dis-
bursed late, and insufficient (Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Gari-
ta). 
Gonzalez-Garita (1986) measured the level and components of 
non-interest borrowing costs for Costa Rican farmers from survey 
data for 394 clients of the Banco Nacional who borrowed, during 
1983, from one of ten selected branches. Since many producers do 
not demand loans when the transactions costs are high, the exclu-
sion of potential borrowers from market participation because of 
too high transactions costs was not observed by this survey of 
borrowers. Similarly, long distances and limited access, due to 
the absence of roads or their poor condition, prevented the 
completion of some of the interviews in the sample. These 
clients do incur in high transactions costs, precisely for the 
same reasons. As a consequence, there was an underestimation of 
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borrowing costs. A detailed questionnaire measured fees and 
commissions, taxes and document costs, and travel expenses 
{weighted in the case of multipurpose trips). The interview also 
generated information to impute the opportunity cost of the time 
of the borrower and of those acting on his behalf. For these 
purposes, the minimum wage in agriculture was used, which under-
estimated true time costs. 
The average level of the non-interest costs of borrowing was 
high, as shown in Table 11. It amounted to 6.8 percent of loan 
size and, when adjusted for loan term, it was equivalent to 11.5 
percent per year. Since average interest rates were 13.6 percent, 
the total cost of the funds was at least 25 percent per year. 
This high level was surprising, given the small size of the coun-
try, the extension of the network of roads and bank branches, and 
the development objectives of the NBS. 
On the average, therefore, interest payments represented 54 
percent of the total cost of the funds. In the case of smaller 
borrowers {less than US$ 200), however, interest accounted for 
only 25 percent of total borrowing costs, while for larger bor-
rowers (US$ 10,000 and over} interest accounted for 86 percent of 
these costs. 
More notable was the dispersion of the non-interest borrow-
ing costs. While interest rates ranged between 8 and 30 percent 
per year, non-interest costs ranged between 0.2 and 117.5 percent 
per year. The total cost of the funds ranged between 10.8 and 
129.5 percent per year, compared to an annual rate of inflation 
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of 26 percent. There was a four-fold difference among interest 
rates and a 600-fold difference among the non-interest costs of 
borrowing. Non-interest borrowing costs per colon declined 
rapidly with loan size, from 37 percent for loans of less than 
US$ 200, to 2.8 percent for loans above US$ 1,000. 
The existence of the trade-off between the interest and non-
interest costs of borrowing was confirmed. Underequilibrium in-
terest rates generated excess de.mands for credit that required 
strict rationing criteria (more complex procedures, additional 
steps, and waiting) and thereby increased borrowing costs. The 
strict end-use targeting for the funds, supervision, and eligi-
bility requirements also increased borrowing costs (Graham). 
Borrowing costs were higher in the case of small, basic-
grain producers than for export-oriented farmers, and when the 
collateral was a cosigner rather than a mortgage. The positive 
elasticity of borrowing costs with respect to distance suggested 
the potential social gains from a further geographical expansion 
of the branch network and from a reduction of the required number 
of trips to the branch. 
The 394 borrowers interviewed made 3,675 trips to the 
branches, with a total duration of 14, 7 00 working hours. This 
represented an average of 4.5 full working days for the client, 
usually at the time of planting. The average number of trips was 
9.3 per borrower, and it ranged between 1 and 19 trips per loan. 
Borrowing costs were higher with those with previous delinquency 
records and lower for those who were also depositors in the bank, 
as shown in Table 11. 
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The nationalization of the banks seems to have had a mixed 
impact on farmer access to credit. By promoting an unprecedented 
expansion of the network of rural branches, it reduced borrower 
transactions costs. Interest-rate subsidies, excessive target-
ing, bureaucratic procedures, and X-inefficiency attributable to 
the nationalization, on the other hand, sharply increased 
transactions costs. 
xv. Intermediation Costs and Bank Profitability 
The debate between the advocates of public enterprise on the 
one hand and of private firms on the other has been going on for 
a long time. The issues are complex and no definitive answers 
have been obtained. Differences between the two types of organ-
ization are related, among other things, to the constraints im-
posed on managers by the external capital markets, to the incen-
tives that result from the internal organization of the firm, and 
to the behavior of management (Waterson). 
The impossibility to transfer the rights of ownership in the 
state-owned banks leads to a weaker linkage between management 
performance and rewards which, in turn, reduces efficiency. In a 
comparison between private and state-owned banks in Australia, 
Davies concluded that the "managers of government-owned banks 
hold a higher proportion of their bank's assets in low-risk and 
low-paying investments than do they private counterparts. They 
also arrange their bank's affairs so that they have easier, less 
arduous lives. Their firms grow more rapidly and have larger 
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staffs than privately organized enterprises. Public managers 
also organize work and workers less effectively than do private 
managers. This result is reflected in the subs tan ti vely lower 
profit rates manifested in the public sector." There has been a 
growing consensus that most of these features, with some quali-
fication with respect to the treatment of risk, have also charac-
terized the Costa Rican nationalized banks. 
The private banks were nationalized explicitly to eliminate 
the profit-maximization motive from their objective function. 
Over the years the Qanks have earned, indeed, a minuscule rate of 
return on their capital, even after accrued interest not actually 
received on delinquent loans has been included as part of their 
accounting earnings. When losses due to defaulted loans are con-
sidered, they have incurred in substantial losses most of the 
time. As a result, in real terms their capital declined by 54 
percent between 1966 and 1976 and by an additional 57 percent be-
tween 1976 and 1983. By 1985, in real terms the accounting cap-
ital and reserves of the NBS represented only 60 percent of the 
1966 level (Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). If defaulted loans were 
written off, the reduction in capital would be even greater. 
The losses, moreover, have not been due to relatively narrow 
financial margins. On the contrary, they have reflected extreme-
ly high intermediation costs in the presence of wide bank 
margins. When these costs are added to those imposed on deposit-
ors and borrowers, it is clear that the nationalization of the 
banks has required a substantial use of resources for the 
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completion of financial transactions. This has been a waste that 
the country could ill afford. 
As shown in Table 12, non-financial intermediation costs at 
the Banco Nacional represented 6.3 percent of the effective vol-
ume of funds mobilized, net of reserve requirements. When ac-
crued interest not effectively earned was added, the gross margin 
required for zero profits was 10.2 percent of the effective mob-
ilization. Deposit-mobilization costs represented 2. 2 percent 
and lending costs 4.1 percent of effective mobilization. The bank 
earned 18.3 percent as accrued interest on its loans and invest-
ments and paid 10.3 percent on the funds mobilized. This left the 
bank with a margin of 8.0 percentage points to cover intermedia-
tion costs and losses due to default. Transactions costs of 10.2 
percent resulted, therefore, in a loss of 2.1 percent as a pro-
portion of effective mobilization. When the reserves against de-
fault, depreciation, and staff layoff payments are added, the 
losses amounted to 4.4 percent of the total mobilization of funds 
(Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). Another study claimed that the differ-
ence between the average loan and deposit interest rates at the 
state-owned banks was 11. 3 percent, compared to 3. 9 percent at 
the private banks (Sagot). 
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XVI. Political Economy of Liberalization, Default and 
Rescheduling 
Since 1984 the Central Bank, under the leadership of Eduardo 
Lizano, has slowly undertaken a financial reform. The tapes were 
gradually eliminated and the state-owned banks were given greater 
independence in the setting of their interest rates. The scope of 
credit subsidies was specifically defined and limited. Automatic 
access to Central Bank credit by CODESA and other autonomous in-
stitutions was eliminated. An increasing scope was provided for 
the private commercial banks to compete with the nationalized 
banks. The Central Bank attempted to regulate monetary expansion 
with reserve requirements and open market operations, rather than 
quantitative credit restrictions, as explained by Lizana (1987). 
Lizano's strategy had been to introduce the reforms gradual-
ly and slowly in order to minimize political opposition. Gradual-
ism, however, allowed time for those hurt by the elimination of 
the subsidies to combine and exert increasing pressure for the 
reversal of the policy reforms. Opposition came, in particular, 
from the agricultural sector, which had recently enjoyed substan-
tial price, credit, insurance, and other subsidies. As Mesalles 
discusses, the situation became politically sensitive when severe 
droughts and a reductions in the international price of several 
export crops created a crisis in the agricultural sector. While 
Lizana managed to obtain support for his ref arms, agricultural 
lobbies obtained legislation to reschedule most delinquent agri-
cultural loans at subsidized interest rates. The organizational 
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deficiencies of the nationalized banks and the political economy 
environment had led the banks not to focus their institutional 
capacity to deal with risk in lending decisions (Von Pischke) • 
Substantial portions of the portfolio became overdue, as a con-
sequence, during the 1980s. 
The rescheduling legislation (FODEA) which mandated debt re-
lief for delinquent agricultural borrowers was enacted by unanim-
ity. The implicit subsidy is substantial and it is heavily con-
centrated in favor of large farmers. In the case of the Banco 
Nacional, of the 12,593 farmer with rescheduled loans, 10,461 are 
smaller borrowers (less than US$ 20,000 in total borrowing), but 
they account for only 26 percent of the amounts rescheduled. An-
other 1,508 farmers (with total borrowing between US$ 20,000 and 
US$ 70,000) account for 30 percent of the total amount delinquent 
and 624 clients (with borrowing above US$ 70,000) are responsible 
for 44 percent of the arrears. A similar distribution character-
izes the delinquent portfolio of the other state-owned banks. 
Under the assumption of a rate of inflation of 20 percent 
per year during the 16 years of the rescheduling, the present 
value of the implicit subsidy associated with FODEA amounted to 
US$ 20 million. With the rate of inflation at 40 percent, this 
subsidy is equivalent to US$ 30 million. About five percent of 
the beneficiaries (the largest delinquent borrowers) will capture 
between 30 and 40 percent of this massive transfer of income 
(Mesalles). This has been one of the most impressive examples of 
the power of the rent-seeking interest groups within a national-
ized banking system. 
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Conclusions 
Most of the literature on government intervention in banking 
has been concerned with the benefits from the correction of 
market failures, that would lead private bankers to behavior in-
compatible with social-welfare maximization, and with the costs 
that occur as a result of organizational failure, such as the 
failure of public banks to minimize intermediation costs (Bra-
verman and Guasch). This paper has taken a different, political 
economy approach. It claims that the decisions that shape the 
behavior of the nationalized banks are not made by neutral so-
cial-welfare maximizers concerned only with economic growth, but 
by individuals representing particular group interests and having 
broader political objectives (Ahmad). 
The nationalized banks of Costa Rica have been only one of 
the arenas in which contending forces have played their quest for 
economic and political power. One of the most important osten-
sible reasons for the nationalization of the banks in 1948 was 
the desire to separate the economic power of the banks from the 
political power of the traditional exporting groups. To a large 
extent, this goal was achieved. The more general objective of 
separating economic from political forces in the banking arena, 
however, was not accomplished. This paper has illustrated how 
political intrusion has increasingly characterized the evolution 
of the NBS. Economic and political power have been joined again, 
this time in different hands. 
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The authors are, respectively, Professor of Agricultural 
Economics and of Economics and Graduate Research Associate at the 
Ohio State University. This revised version of an earlier paper 
was prepared for the Project on Policy Tools for Rural Finance in 
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Approaches to Rural Savings in San Jose, as part of the coopera-
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Table 1. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Money and Credit Aggre-
gates. Average Annual Rates of Growth in Real Terms. (Per-
centages). 1950-1986. 
1950-62 1962-70 1970-78 1978-82 1982-86 
Net Domestic Credit 
Net Public Sector 
Private Sector 
Other Net Domestic Assets 
Total Liquidity (M2) 
Quasimoney 
Money (Ml) 
Foreign Borrowing by Banks 
10.2 
4.6 
11.3 
6.9 
8.8 
11.4 
7.7 
n.a. 
5.5 
8.7 
5.1 
8.9 
7.6 
8.3 
7.2 
7.9 
11.1 
20.6 
8.8 
20.4 
13.8 
21.0 
8.5 
19.0 
-17.7 
-7.7 
-22.6 
46.3 
-8.9 
-5.6 
-13.6 
16.5 
18.1 
22.8 
14.0 
14.2 
10.4 
8.9 
12.8 
30.8 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index. 
Table 2. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Ratios of Money and 
Credit Aggregates to the GDP. (Percentages). 1950-1986. 
1950 1962 1970 1978 1982 1986 
Net Domestic Credit 21.6 30.2 28.9 40.5 33.1 36.3 
Net Public Sector 4.6 3.4 4.1 11.1 14.4 18.4 
Private Sector 17.0 26.8 24.7 29.4 18.7 17.8 
Total Liquidity (M2) 18.4 21.8 24.4 41.6 51.0 42.6 
Quasimoney 4.4 7.0 8.3 22.9 32.4 25.7 
Money (Ml) 14.0 14.8 16.1 18.7 18.6 16.9 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
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Table 3. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of Money 
and Credit Aggregates (Percentages). 1950-1986. 
1950 1962 1970 1978 1982 1986 
Net Domestic Credit 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public Sector 21.1 11.3 14.3 27.5 43.4 50.8 
Private Sector 78.9 88.7 85.7 72.5 56.6 49.2 
Total Liquidity (M2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Quasimoney 24.0 32.2 33.9 55.1 63.6 60.2 
Money (Ml) 76.0 67.8 66.1 44.9 36.4 39.8 
source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
Table 4. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Size Distribution 
of Agricultural Credit (Cumulative Percentages). 
1974 and 1981. 
Size 1974 1981 
(CR$) Number Amount Number Amount 
Less than 1,000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
From 1,001 to 5,ooo 89.89 99.82 97.50 100.00 
From 5,001 to 15,000 47.61 96.68 70.50 99.20 
From 15,001 to 50,000 22.83 90.83 33.80 96.20 
From 50,001 to 100,000 8.52 80.98 13.50 91. 30 
From 100,001 to 500,000 4.50 73.44 8.70 88.20 
From 500,001 to 1,000,000 1.19 55.60 3.40 77.80 
Over 1,000,000 0 .. 70 46.43 2.20 70.10 
Sources: Vogel (1984) and Loria (1982). 
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Table 5. Q>sta Rica: Banco Nacion.al de Costa Rica. Depart.n>.nt. of Rur-dl Credit. Nunber, Annmt, md 
Average Size of New wans Grcmted during the Year am of Balances Out.stardi~ 
at the end of the Year. 1950-1986. 
NEW UWf> OOIBTNEINJ BALAtnS 
Nllnber of Anvmt Average Size Nllnber of AnDmt Average Size 
Year Loans ( '000 1978 CR$) (1978 (}$) I.oons ( '000 1978 CR$) (1978 CR$) 
1950 17,752 57,705.2 3,250.6 21,547 67,763.4 3,144.9 
1951 19,403 69,606.4 3,587.4 23.712 90,231.0 3,805.3 
1952 19,994 90,293.3 4,516.0 24,998 112,642.5 4,506.l 
1953 18,006 91,563.1 5,085.1 24,794 123.548.5 4,983.0 
1954 16,838 89,049.0 5,288.6 24,877 124,429.2 5,001.8 
1955 16,967 94,466.9 5,587.7 26,456 138,199.0 5,223.7 
1956 17,625 108,824.2 6,174.4 n.a. 164,089.2 n.a. 
1957 16,675 105,346.4 6,317.6 28,187 168,917.2 5,992.7 
1958 15,275 102,263.1 6,694.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1959 15,79'1 118,416.7 7,496.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1960 15,989 157,818.2 9,870.4 28,075 229,403.6 8,171.1 
1961 16,007 142,549.9 8,905.5 n.a. 268,006.3 n.a. 
1962 19,293 216,560.8 11,224.8 35,190 339,040.4 9,634.6 
1963 16,107 165,065.9 10,248.1 36,071 350,911.8 9,728.4 
1964 16,209 199,551.l 12,311.l 37,732 382,531.7 10,138.1 
1965 17,767 242,230.3 13,633.7 41,218 469,136.7 11,381.8 
1966 11.791 138,314.4 11,730.5 39,141 436,070.l 11.141.0 
1967 16,063 210,346.6 13,095.1 39,964 443,510.2 11,097.7 
1968 14,037 l~,40'1.8 12,8.?2.3 38,465 433,441.3 11,268.5 
1969 11,996 184,599.8 15,388.4 37,252 440,892.1 11,835.4 
1970 13,148 193,643.9 14,728.0 38,015 454,415.7 11,953.6 
1971 17,965 274,366.8 15,272.3 41,992 502,971.1 11,977 .8 
1972 15,825 243,398.7 15,380.6 43,085 501,468.8 11,639.1 
1973 16,208 260,853.1 16,094.l 42,880 438,279.5 10,221.1 
1974 19,841 241,192.3 12,156.3 45,715 385,316.1 8,428.7 
1975 23,436 2D3,547.3 8,685.2 51,173 378,516.3 7,396.8 
1976 24,284 226,175.9 9,313.8 53,234 397,119.8 7.459.9 
1977 21,351 210,232.6 9,846.5 51,261 381,215.4 7,436.8 
1978 19,861 235,122.2 11,838.4 49,260 399,504.7 8,110.1 
1979 18,721 199,112.9 10,635.8 48,165 347,723.9 7,219.4 
1980 15,692 135,258.6 8,619.6 45,563 292,112.5 6,411.2 
1981 18,938 126,533.6 6,681.5 44,552 153,276.0 3,440.4 
1982 22,198 108,690.9 4,896.4 39,344 108,973.1 2,769.8 
1983 18,935 131, 178.0 6,927.8 35,691 146,320.9 4,111.2 
1984 19,076 105,329.l 5,521.5 36,650 140,214.3 3,825.8 
1985 16,821 83,602.6 4,970.1 37,971 127,156.0 3,348.8 
1986 18,326 111,916.7 6,107.0 33,731 135,686.8 4,022.6 
Som'ces: Gonzalez-Vega (1973) am Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, \q)Wlished records. 
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Table 6. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Proportion of the Number of 
Loans and of Outstanding Balances by Department. Real Average Loan 
Size by Department and their Ratio. 1970-1987. 
COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT RURAL DEPARTMENT REAL AVERAGE SIZE 
Year Number Amount Number Amount Commercial Rural Com/Rur 
1970 28.8 58.9 60.2 20.9 26,070 4,432 5.9 
1971 24.8 61.1 45.0 20.0 26,569 4,778 5.6 
1972 20.1 63.2 43.4 19.4 34,058 4,836 7.0 
1973 24.6 67.2 75.4 18.0 61,315 5,370 11.4 
1974 28.6 73.1 71.4 15.3 72,692 6,110 11.9 
1975 32.3 78.3 67.7 12.8 78,296 6,122 12.8 
1976 32.7 91.3 59.9 13.7 80,566 6,621 12.2 
1977 38.8 81.0 61.2 11.2 80, 710 7,087 11.4 
1978 46.1 82.0 53.9 10.2 79,276 8,416 9.4 
1979 49.7 84.0 50.3 9.3 85,105 9,289 9.2 
1980 54.0 88.2 46.0 7.2 103,086 9,841 10.5 
1981 n.a. 88.7 n.a. 7.4 n.a. 11,470 n.a. 
1982 n.a. 91.1 n.a. 5.8 n.a. 11, 875 n.a. 
1983 n.a. 90.8 n.a. 7.2 n.a. 25,994 n.a. 
1984 n.a. 91.3 n.a. 6.6 n.a. 27,146 n.a. 
1985 n.a. 91.3 n.a. 6.5 n.a. 25,578 n.a. 
1986 n.a. 90.6 n.a. 6.9 n.a. 34,450 n.a. 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Computed from Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, unpublished records. 
• 
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Table 7. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Annual Real Rates of 
Growth of Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Economic 
Activity (Percentages). 1951-1987. 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total 
17.5 
27.5 
16.3 
2.4 
8.7 
12.8 
18.3 
4.3 
21.8 
10.4 
3.9 
4.8 
20.8 
13.7 
13.2 
-0.1 
2.2 
0.8 
1.6 
8.0 
23.6 
5.0 
-11.8 
3.1 
17.3 
12.1 
9.7 
13.5 
-3.4 
-5.7 
-49.5 
-22.s 
43.0 
5.5 
7.1 
4.8 
10.4 
Agriculture 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
37.4 
-1.8 
20.2 
11.3 
0.7 
-1.0 
19.8 
8.1 
11.4 
1.2 
-4.2 
-1.0 
-1.4 
9.2 
6.9 
-6.8 
-22.3 
-6.9 
27.6 
18.5 
0.4 
15.3 
-11.4 
-1.4 
-41.1 
-13.7 
63.2 
-8.4 
-10.3 
-8.6 
6.2 
Livestock 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.5 
19.2 
40.2 
18.6 
7.2 
8.7 
4.4 
16.1 
25.8 
5.7 
9.3 
9.6 
10.4 
8.0 
31.4 
10.9 
2.1 
-6.7 
-0.1 
9.4 
8.9 
7.6 
-4.4 
-2.8 
-53.3 
-13.0 
48.0 
9.9 
-1.5 
-2.8 
-11.8 
Industry 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.1 
9.6 
30.6 
13.9 
18.5 
16.5 
20.6 
23.8 
18.5 
-4.8 
11.0 
3.0 
7.2 
10.1 
10.3 
8.2 
4.2 
20.2 
19.3 
9.9 
13.4 
15.4 
-9.8 
-14.5 
-49.7 
-14.4 
54.2 
16.1 
18.8 
2.9 
10.5 
Other g/ 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
9.3 
6.1 
13.5 
3.3 
0.5 
5.6 
33.1 
14.5 
6.0 
-2.5 
0.7 
-4.6 
-5.6 
4.7 
51. 7 
10.2 
-24.8 
9.2 
25.4 
11.2 
14.7 
15.0 
8.7 
-3.6 
-52.1 
-40.4 
5.9 
8.0 
25.1 
28.8 
30.0 
g/ Includes: Commerce, electricity, services, housing, personal 
credit, credit to foreigners and unclassified credit. 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito 
y~uentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by 
the Wholesale Price Index. 
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Table 8. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of 
Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Economic Activity 
(Percentages). 1950-1987. 
Year Agriculture Livestock Industry Other g/ 
1950 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1951 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1952 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1953 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1954 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1955 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1956 40.1 13.7 12.4 33.8 
1957 46.6 11.7 10.4 31.2 
1958 43.9 13.4 11.0 31.7 
1959 43.3 15.4 11.8 29.6 
1960 43.6 16.6 12.1 27.7 
1961 42.3 17.1 13.8 26.8 
1962 39.9 17.7 15.4 27.0 
1963 39.6 15.3 15.4 29.7 
1964 37.7 15.6 16.7 30.0 
1965 37.1 17.4 17.5 28.0 
1966 37.5 18.4 16.7 27.4 
1967 35.2 19.7 18.1 27.0 
1968 34.6 21.4 18.5 25.5 
1969 33.5 23.2 19.5 23.7 
1970 33.9 23.2 19.9 23.0 
1971 29.3 24.7 17.8 28.2 
1972 26.0 26.1 18.3 29.6 
1973 22.9 30.2 21.7 25.2 
1974 20.7 27.3 25.3 26.7 
1975 22.5 23.3 25.7 28.5 
1976 23.8 22.7 25.2 28.3 
1977 21.8 22.6 26.0 29.6 
1978 22.1 21.4 26.5 30.0 
1979 20.3 21.2 24.7 33.8 
1980 21.2 21.8 22.4 34.6 
1981 24.7 20.2 22.3 32.8 
1982 27.5 22.6 24.6 25.2 
1983 31.4 23.4 26.6 18.7 
1984 27.3 24.4 29.2 19.1 
1985 22.9 22.4 32.4 22.3 
1986 19.9 20.8 31.8 27.4 
1987 19.2 16.6 31.9 32.3 
g/ Includes: Commerce, electricity, services, housing, 
personal credit, credit to foreigners and unclassified 
credit. 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
Amounts deflated by the Wholesale Price Index. 
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Table 9. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Annual Real Growth 
Rates of New Loans Granted (Percentages). 1974-1987. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total Agriculture Livestock Industry Commerce Other g!J 
10.1 
7.0 
4.4 
1.1 
10.1 
-8.1 
-20.2 
-26.3 
-7.3 
17.6 
-13.0 
-11.1 
26.9 
14.8 
8.1 
17.7 
-1.1 
-9.6 
8.9 
-11.5 
-6.8 
-8.2 
20.3 
17.2 
-19.5 
-34.7 
28.7 
14.8 
-14.5 
-25.9 
17.9 
21.4 
6.9 
-3.0 
-12.3 
-44.6 
29.1 
7.9 
-22.9 
-53.9 
44.1 
14.8 
26.3 
5.4 
-2.3 
3.7 
9.0 
-32.0 
-32.5 
-28.9 
13.7 
29.2 
1.0 
14.9 
7.5 
14.8 
126.1 
12.6 
-17.6 
-15.2 
6.9 
72.9 
-7.1 
-35.9 
-42.9 
1.8 
54.7 
46.2 
40.2 
14.8 
-0.8 
21.4 
19.8 
1. 7 
15.0 
7.6 
-27.0 
-26.6 
-57.5 
17.0 
-28.3 
18.5 
54.8 
14.8 
Source: Same as Table 10. 
Table 10. Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of New 
Loans Granted During the Year (Percentages). 1970-1987. 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Total Agriculture Livestock Industry Commerce Other g!J 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
24.8 
24.3 
26.7 
25.3 
22.6 
22.4 
21.6 
25.2 
31.4 
40.7 
40.6 
37.6 
27.6 
28.0 
28.0 
20.8 
16.1 
11. 2 
12.6 
15.1 
14.7 
15.5 
17.1 
12.8 
17.8 
16.4 
14.5 
7.5 
8.5 
8.5 
29.4 
33.7 
33.2 
31.0 
31.8 
31.5 
23.3 
19.7 
19.0 
23.4 
25.7 
29.8 
38.5 
32.6 
32.6 
2.8 
5.8 
6.1 
4.8 
4.0 
3.9 
7.4 
8.6 
7.5 
4.6 
4.0 
7.1 
11. 7 
12.9 
12.9 
22.3 
20.1 
22.8 
26.2 
26.3 
27.5 
32.2 
29.5 
29.3 
13.5 
13.4 
11.0 
14.7 
18.0 
18.0 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
g!J Includes: Electricity, services, housing, personal credit, credit 
to foreigners and unclassified credit. 
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Table 11. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Interest 
and Non-Interest Farmers' Borrowing Cost 
(Percentages) 1983. 
Loan Size 
Less than 10,000 
10,001 to 50,000 
50,001 to 100,000 
100,001 to 500,000 
More than 500,000 
End Use of the Loan 
Export Crops 
Basic Grains 
Other Crops 
Livestock 
Interest Rate 
Less than 12% 
15% 
18-29% 
22-26.5% 
Department 
Commercial 
Rural 
Educational Level 
No Education 
Primary School 
High School 
University 
Default Record 
Yes 
No 
Checking Account 
Yes 
No 
Savings Account 
Yes 
No 
Interest 
Rate 
12.2 
12.5 
13.4 
15.6 
20.1 
15.6 
12.7 
12.1 
15.8 
12.0 
15.0 
18.4 
23.2 
18.1 
12.0 
12.8 
13.l 
14.0 
17.3 
13.7 
12.8 
17.8 
12.7 
14.1 
13.4 
Source: Gonzalez-Garita (1986). 
Average Annualized Cost of 
Cost Av. Cost Funds 
22.5 
6.9 
2.9 
2.4 
2.9 
4.9 
11.5 
5.1 
6.8 
7.7 
3.8 
4.4 
3.3 
3.7 
7.9 
12.1 
8.8 
4.5 
3.0 
8.1 
6.1 
3.3 
7.5 
4.0 
7.7 
37.1 
12.6 
4.4 
2.8 
3.4 
5.2 
26.0 
8.1 
7.0 
13.7 
3.9 
4.4 
4.5 
4.2 
13.9 
19.4 
15.4 
5.7 
3.7 
14.5 
10.0 
3.9 
13.0 
5.5 
13.4 
• 
49.3 
25.1 
17.8 
18.4 
23.5 
20.8 
38.8 
20.2 
22.9 
25.7 
18.9 
22.8 
27.7 
22.2 
26.0 
32.2 
28.1 
19.7 
21.0 
25.3 
23.9 
21.7 
25.7 
19.6 
26.8 
.. 
.. .. 
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Table 12. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Financial 
Intermediation Costs (Million CR$). Revenues and 
Costs as a proportion of Effective Mobilization 
(Percentages). 1985. 
Total Mobilization ~ 
Actual Reserves .QI 
Effective Mobilization 
Interest and Commissions Accrued 
Non-Financial Lending Cost 
Expected Net Lending Revenue 
Defaulted Interest 
Effective Net Lending Revenue 
Interest and Commissions Paid 
Non-Financial Mobilization Cost 
Total Mobilization Cost 
Gross Effective Profits £/ 
Reserve Against Default 
Depreciation Reserve 
Layoff Reserve 
Net Effective Profits after Reserves 
Expected Intermediation Margin 
Effective Intermediation Margin 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs 
plus Defaulted Interest 
AMOUNT 
23,746.3 
3,640.7 
--------
20,105.7 
======== 
3,685.3 
833.2 
--------
2,852.0 
769.0 
--------
2,083.1 
======== 
2,062.8 
441.4 
--------
2,504.2 
--------
(421.1) 
425.0 
21.2 
27.4 
--------(894.7) 
======== 
1,622.5 
853.5 
1,274.6 
2,043.5 
PERCENTAGE 
100.0 
15.3 
--------
84.7 
--------
18.3 
4.1 
--------
14.2 
3.8 
--------
10.4 
--------
--------
10.3 
2.2 
--------
12.5 
--------
( 2 .1) 
2.1 
0.1 
0.1 
--------(4.4) 
--------
8.1 
4.2 
6.3 
10.2 
~ Average of outstanding daily balances of all funds mobilized 
(Deposits from the public, Bonds placed with the public, Loans 
and Rediscounts from the Central Banks, and Foreign Loans) • 
.QI Average daily balances of actual reserves held by the bank. 
£1 Effective net lending revenue - Total mobilization costs. 
Source: Gonzalez-Garita (1987). 
